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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid proliferation of Internet traffic and convenient availability of
open source tools to launch malicious attacks, the challenge for network intrusion
detection has increased manifold over the past few years. A simple attack launched
by a novice can cause huge financial losses to an organization. Detecting such
attacks is an important first step in securing a computer network. In general,
malicious attacks against computer networks can be categorized into four types
- Denial of Service (DoS), Probing, User to Root (U2R), and Remote to Local
(R2L) attacks.
In the case of Distributed Denial of Service attacks, machines participating in
launching the attack do not rely on a protocol vulnerability, but rather prevent
legitimate users from using network resources, by sending high volumes of traf-
fic toward the victim machine. As a result, traffic will aggregate from different
streams at the victim, causing the victim to be incapacitated. These malicious
machines will keep sending high rates of traffic purposely regardless of time outs.
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However, legitimate users who uses a standard implementation of the TCP pro-
tocol with slow start implementation will suffer timeouts that will affect their
congestion window, which will throttle their sending capacity. As a result, legit-
imate traffic will be proportionally low as compared to the attack traffic during
an attack time.
As can be voted, fast detection of such attacks leads to a faster contisenus
which will help the victim to trigger appropriate prevention measures that mitigate
the effects of the attack. Attacks victims ranges from a single machine to an
entire infrastructure network. The attacks range from Teardrop attacks to denial
of service attacks on the network infrastructure. The latter case is the most
critical. Denial of service attacks can result in interruption of businesses or even
government services which can effects millions of clients.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have gained significance due to their ability
to defend computer networks against the continuous evolution of various types
of attacks. Network-based IDS’ detect these attacks by monitoring ingoing and
outgoing traffic in order to detect the existence of possible outliers in the traffic
patterns, where outliers can be anomalous traffic. Intrusion detecion systems can
be categorized into two types - a) Anomaly detectors, which detect deviations
of network traffic behavior from predefined normal traffic profiles, and b) Misuse
detectors, which attempt to find signatures of malicious patterns known to the IDS
beforehand [1]. Anomaly detection techniques define the normal profile of traffic,
and attempt to track deviations from that profile to classify them as intrusions.
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False alarms can have very high cost depending on the defense mechanism used
by the victim network. For example, if the victim network uses client puzzles as
a defense mechanism, clients will not be able to connect to the network unless
they solve cryptographic puzzles. These puzzles are designed to take enough
CPU time as a proof of work that the client is sincere in need for the service [2].
Malicious and non-malicious clients should solve the puzzle before getting access
to the service. This will allow the server to serve under DoS attacks at the cost of
degraded service. So as you can see false alarm can lead to degrade the service [2].
Signature based intrusion detection systems use a database of intrusion signa-
tures for intrusion detection. Because of this, they can not detect novel intrusions,
whose signatures do not exist in the signatures database. As a result, to keep up
with intrusions, they need a frequent update of the signatures database. Using
a signature database makes these types of intrusion detection systems attractive
in terms of accuracy and speed, where the accuracy is measured in terms of less
number of false positives [3, 4].
Anomaly based intrusion detection systems can detect novel attacks by gen-
eralization of learning rules. they profile the normal behavior of network traffic
and detect deviations from that normal behavior to classify them as intrusions.
Anomaly based IDS use machine learning and statistical information used to de-
tect the existence of attacks. With the ability to generalize rules from learned
data, anomaly based IDS perform generalization of attacks and fault tolerance to
imprecise and uncertain information. Examples of such approaches include Sup-
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port Vector Machines SVMs, Na¨ıve Bayesian, Decision Trees, Neural Networks
and Genetic Programming [3, 4]. For this thesis, my research will focus on the
measurement of performance of anomaly based intrusion detection systems, when
two specific algorithms are applied, namely, AODE and GMDH.
1.1 Research Motivation
The motivation for this work lies in the lack of an existing mechanism for
rapid and intelligent detection of anomalies in network traffic. It is intended to
propose two machine learning-based approaches for detecting network intrusions,
and to compare and contrast simulation results acquired when the two schemes
are implemented and tested. The resulting analysis may pave inroads towards a
new breed of intrusion detection systems that will possibly be adaptable at a large
scale for effective and efficient detection.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the use of an alternative tech-
nique of abductive networks, namely, the group method of data handling (GMDH)
algorithm [4][5], and the use of Averaged One-Dependence Estimators (AODE),
for detecting anomalous network traffic. The results of the two methods are com-
pared with each other and with results documented from previously proposed
intelligent intrusion detection systems.
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1.3 Thesis Contributions
To achieve the thesis objectives, the contributions of this thesis are listed as
follows:
 Review the existing literature on the use of intelligent techniques for anoma-
lous traffic detection.
 Propose a GMDH-based and an AODE-based technique for intrusion detec-
tion.
 Implement the two techniques using software-based tools and perform a
simulation.
 Compare the results of the proposed approaches in terms of defined perfor-
mance metrics.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of intelligent
approaches and techniques used in anomalous traffic detection. In Chapter 3,
different approaches were explored for selecting the most representative features of
network traffic based on several defined criteria. An implementation of a GMDH-
based IDS discussed in Chapter 4. The results acquired from simulation are
analyzed. Subsequently, (Chapter 5) discusses the AODE-based anomalous traffic
detection technique, with simulation and analysis. The thesis finally concludes
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in Chapter 6, where the overall comparison of the two proposed approaches is
elaborated upon, and a list of potential improvements and suggestions for future
work are provided.
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CHAPTER 2
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
In this chapter, Anomalous Traffic Detection techniques used in the literature
are summarized. In addition, applications of neural networks in anomalous traffic
detection from literature are also summarized.
2.1 Multilayer Perceptron
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is a supervised learning algorithm, which uses
a feed-forward structure to solve classification problems. MLP neural networks
are trained by manipulating the weights of the neural network connections. The
network weights are updated by using different functions during the training pe-
riod, such as the gradient-based optimization algorithm. The most common MLP
training functions are shown in Table 8. When the network converges to the local
minima of error, the output layer of the network will show the expected result
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when data is fed into the input layer. Faraoun and Boukelif [5] propose a hybrid
method of k-means algorithm and MLP. They use the k-means algorithm to group
the input data into a number of clusters, which in their case is 20 (based on the
number of attacks provided in KDD99). The distances between the centers of
clusters and input data points are calculated, and only the most discriminating
samples that cover the maximum the region of each class, are selected for the
learning process. The selected samples are then presented to the MLP network
for classification into four classes of attacks, namely, DoS, Probing, U2R, and
R2L.
An MLP for misuse detection is proposed in two configurations by Cannady [6].
The first configuration is a stand alone and the second configuration uses a rule-
based expert system. The proposed scheme uses nine traffic features as input to
the MLP, which means the input layer should contain nine neurons. The MLP
network consists of three layers: the input layer with nine neurons, the hidden
layer and the output layer with two neurons, with all layers being fully connected.
The Sigmoid function is used as a transfer function between the neurons. The
author uses 10,000 data points, with 1,000 of them used for testing, and the
remaining for training.
2.2 Self-Organizing Maps
A Self- Organizing Maps (SOM) is an unsupervised learning algorithm to group
similar data into clusters in the input space. It is a data visualization technique
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Function Description
Traingd Basic gradient descent. Slow response, can be
used in incremental mode training.
Traingdm Gradient descent with momentum. Generally
faster than traingd. Can be used in incrementa
mode training.
Traingdx Adaptive learning rate. Faster training than
traingd, but can only be used in batch mod
training.Resilient back propagation. Simple
batch mode training algorithm with fast con-
vergence an minimal storage requirements.
Trainrp Fletcher-Reeves conjugate gradient algorithm.
Have smallest storage requirements of th con-
jugate gradient algorithms.
Traincgf Polak-Ribiere conjugate gradient algorithm.
Slightly larger storage requirements than
traincgf.Faster convergence on some problems.
Traincgp Powell-Beale conjugate gradient algorithm.
Slightly larger storage requirements than
traincgp.
Traincgb Generally faster convergence.
Trainscg Scaled conjugate gradient algorithm. The only
conjugate gradient algorithm that requires n
line search. A very good general purpose train-
ing algorithm.
Trainbfg BFGS quasi-Newton method. Requires stor-
age of approximate Hessian matrix and has
mor computation in each iteration than conju-
gate gradient algorithms, but usually converges
i fewer iterations.
Trainoss One step secant method. Compromise between
conjugate gradient methods and quasi-Newto
methods.
Trainlm Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. Fastest train-
ing algorithm for networks of moderate size.
Ha memory reduction feature for use when the
training set is large.
Table 2.1: MLP training functions [7]
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that produces a low dimensional topological map to help people to understand
the original high dimensional data. Once the neural network is trained, the map
converges to a stationary distribution and shows a clear separation between normal
traffic and attack traffic. The output neurons are considered as the counts for
normal and attack traffic points. After building the map using training data,
future connections can be quickly classified as normal or attacks based on their
location in map. Kayacik et al. [8, 9], Depren et al. [10], and DeLooze [9] used
SOM in their IDS research.
2.3 Emergent Self-Organizing Maps
Kohonens Emergent Self-Organizaing Maps belong to Kohonens Self-
Organizing maps (KSOMs) which has its base in biology. It is also called a
winner-take-all unsupervised learning neural network. They are unsupervised
because there is no target vector which requires the administrator to label the
clusters into normal cluster and attack clusters. This approach has advantage of
combining machine learning and visualization techniques. However, KSOMs has
limited number of neurons in order of tens which is not enough for huge traffic
analysis. Emergent Self-Organizing Maps solve this limitation. They produce
topological maps that illustrate the input data according to their similarity [11].
The map will represent the network traffic in data points in clusters which help to
classify it into normal or anomalous depending on the position of its best match
cluster. Valleys will have the data points belong to same class of traffic. Borders
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Figure 2.1: ESOM Map Demo
[9,11]
will have some points that can be classified to the nearest matched valley. ESOM
sample map is shown in Figure 2.1
2.4 The Random Neural Network
The Random Neural Network (RNN) model was introduced by Gelenbe [12,
13]. It is used successfully for a wide range of applications. It comes in two
architectures, namely, feed-forward or a fully recurrent architecture. RNNs have
strong generalization capabilities, even when training data set is relatively small
compared to the actual testing data. The model also achieves fast learning due
to its computational simplicity for the weight updating process. RNN was used
by Oke et al in [14] for DDoS attack detection. RRN was used in conjunction
with statistical variables like maximum likelihood, Hurst parameter and Entropy.
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Hurst parameter gives network traffic self-similarity while Entropy shows how
much data is contained in the traffic, that differentiates significantly between
normal traffic and anomalous traffic [14].
2.5 Bayesian Learning
It is a supervised generative learning technique that uses probabilistic mod-
els and prior knowledge in classification of an observation. Bayesian integration
does not suffer from the overfitting problem, according to [15]. Prior knowledge
can be incorporated naturally and all uncertainty is manipulated in a consistent
manner [15]. Moreover it is possible to learn model structures and readily com-
pare between model classes. There are different classes of BN classifiers includes
Nave-Bayes, Tree augmented Nave-Bayes (TANs), Bayesian network augmented
Nave-Bayes (BANs), Bayesian multi-nets and general Bayesian networks (GBNs).
It is used extensively in text categorization in general and studied extensively in
SPAM detection. However, it was used rarely in intrusion detection even though
it has very good generalization ability. Bayesian networks suffer from assuming
independence between the events which make it less accurate. Many proposals
were proposed to solve this problem including LBR and Super-Parent TAN. Al-
though, these techniques demonstrate high error performance, they suffer from
high computational cost. A new approach, with accuracy performance compa-
rable to LBR and Super-Parent TAN, solved the problem of independence by
averaging all of constrained class of classifiers. AODE solves also the problem of
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high computation of its precedents. AODE has low variance and is suitable for
incremental learning [16].
2.6 GMDH
This method was proposed in 1968 by Prof. Ivakhnenko at the Institute
of Cybernetics in Kiev. Group method of data handling (GMDH) is a family
of inductive algorithms for computer-based mathematical modeling of multi-
parametric datasets that automatically synthesize optimized polynomial network
structures. The most popular base function used in GMDH is the gradually
complicated Kolmogorov-Gabor polynomial:
y(x1, x2, ..., xn) = a0 +
n∑
i=1
aixi+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i
aijxixj+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i
n∑
k=j
aijkxixjxk+ ... (2.1)
The resulting structure is a feed-forward structure network, aka polynomial
neural network, because of its multi-layered structure, with each node having a
polynomial activation function.
GMDH uses certain criterion to describe the model requirement. For e.g, the
criterion of regularity, and Criterion of Unbiasedness. Usually, the criterion is
calculated using different part of data that have not been used for coefficient
estimation.
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2.7 Summary
Due to the high computation overhead and low detection rates, the intelligent
techniques defined in this chapter do not provide for a strong intrusion detection
mechanism. GMDH and AODE have not been studied yet. Due to their respec-
tive tendencies to correlate data in different manners, we postulate that their
application to an IDS holds promise. We therefore introduce our proposed IDS’,
based on these two techniques, in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA SET PREPROCESSING
3.1 The Dataset
NSL-KDD is a dataset proposed by Tavallaee et al. to solve some of the
problems of the KDD’99 data set which are mentioned in [17, 18]. NSL-KDD
dataset is a reduced version of the original KDD-99 dataset. NSL-KDD consists
of the same features as KDD-99. Table 3.1 shows each feature with its type and
description. The KDD-99 dataset consists of 41 features and one class attribute.
The class attribute has 21 classes that fall under the previously defined four types
of attacks: Probe attacks, User to Root (U2R) attacks, Remote to Local (R2L)
attacks and Denial of Service attacks. This dataset has a binary class attribute.
Also, it has a reasonable number of training and test instances which makes it
practical to run the experiments on.
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Table 3.1: NSL-KDD Original Feature Description.
Feature Description Type
1 duration length (no. of seconds) of the
connection
continuous
2 protocol type type of the protocol discrete
3 service network service on the destina-
tion
discrete
4 flag status flag of the connection discrete
5 src bytes no. of data bytes from source to
destination
continuous
6 dst bytes no. of data bytes from destina-
tion to source
continuous
7 land 1 if connection is from/to the
same host/port; 0 otherwise
discrete
8 wrong fragment no. of wrong fragments continuous
9 urgent no. of urgent packets continuous
10 hot no. of hot indicators continuous
11 num failed logins no. of failed logins continuous
12 logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 oth-
erwise
discrete
13 num compromised no. of compromised conditions continuous
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 –NSL-KDD Original Feature Description – continued
Feature Description Type
14 root shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 oth-
erwise
continuous
15 su attempted 1 if su root command attempted;
0 otherwise
continuous
16 num root no. of root accesses continuous
17 num file creations no. of file creation operations continuous
18 num shells no. of shell prompts continuous
19 num access files no. of operations on access con-
trol files
continuous
20 num outbound cmds no. of outbound commands in
an ftp session
continuous
21 is host login 1 if the login belongs to the hot
list; 0 otherwise
discrete
22 is guest login 1 if the login is a guest login; 0
otherwise
discrete
23 count no. of connections to the same
host as the current connection in
the past two seconds
continuous
24 srv count no. of connections to the same
service as the current connection
in the past two seconds
continuous
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 –NSL-KDD Original Feature Description – continued
Feature Description Type
25 serror rate % of connections that have SYN
errors
continuous
26 srv serror rate % of connections that have SYN
errors
continuous
27 rerror rate % of connections that have REJ
errors
continuous
28 srv rerror rate % of connections that have REJ
errors
continuous
29 same srv rate % of connections to the same ser-
vice
continuous
30 diff srv rate % of connections to different ser-
vices
continuous
31 srv diff host rate % of connections to different
hosts
continuous
32 dst host count count of connections having the
same destination host
continuous
33 dst host srv count count of connections having the
same destination host and using
the same service
continuous
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 –NSL-KDD Original Feature Description – continued
Feature Description Type
34 dst host same srv rate % of connections having the
same destination host and using
the same service
continuous
35 dst host diff srv rate % of different services on the cur-
rent host
continuous
36 dst host same src port rate % of connections to the current
host having the same src port
continuous
37 dst host srv diff host rate % of connections to the same ser-
vice coming from different hosts
continuous
38 dst host serror rate % of connections to the current
host that have an S0 error
continuous
39 dst host srv serror rate % of connections to the current
host and specified service that
have an S0 error
continuous
40 dst host rerror rate % of connections to the current
host that have an RST error
continuous
41 dst host srv rerror rate % of connections to the current
host and specified service that
have an RST error
continuous
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3.2 Nominal features
GMDH-type algorithms deal only with numeric features. This limitation is in-
herited from the regression based nature of GMDH. As can be seen from Table 3.1,
all features are numeric except three features, namely, protocol type, service and
flag. These features need to be converted into numeric values, so that the GMDH
algorithm can be applied on this dataset. This can be done using feature transfor-
mation, by replacing the $k-valued$ features with k-binary features. Each feature
takes a binary value 0 or 1, to represent the existence of a value. We used Weka1
NominalToBinary filter to get a dataset with features compatible with the inputs
of GMDH AIM networks. The resulting dataset was found to contain 123 numeric
features. This number is reduced to 75, by the use of feature selection algorithms,
as described in Section 3.4.
3.3 Discretization of numeric features
Averaged One Dependence Estimators, on the other hand, can not deal with
numeric features. AODE can deal only with nominal attributes. As a result, we
need to discretize numeric values of the dataset. For sake of comparison with
GMDH, the 75 features dataset used by GMDH algorithm are discretized, which
is accomplished using the supervised version of the attribute discretize filter in
Weka. There are two discretization approaches implemented in Weka. The first
approach is to discretize features without using the knowledge of class values. This
approach is called unsupervised discretization. The other approach, on the other
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hands, uses class knowledge for discretization. This approach is called supervised
discretization. Supervised discretization uses equal frequency binning with some
conservations. It sacrifices the equal frequency property to preserve class separa-
tion in each bin. We used supervised discretization algorithm because it helps to
improve the performance of intrusion detection systems.
3.4 Feature Selection
Not every feature is relevant to the intrusion detection task, as they do not
contribute much to the process. Redundant features are defined as features
correlated with one or more other features. A key problem is how to choose
the most relevant features which will be used for intrusion detection. Since not
every feature of the training data may be relevant to the detection task and,
in the worse case, irrelevant features may introduce noise and redundancy into
the design of intrusion detection systems, choosing a good subset of features is
critical to improve the performance of such systems.
Strategies used in selecting the most prominent features can be categorized
into two main types: filter methods and wrapper methods. Filter methods
filter the features to create the most prominent feature subset before the start
of learning process. On the other hand, wrapper methods incorporate learning
techniques in selection of the most prominent feature subset. This makes the
results of wrapper methods more optimized for classification algorithm because
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of incorporation of feature selection in the algorithm [19–21]. In this chapter,
we will use both approaches to select the most prominent attributes. Feature
selection algorithms were used to meet the constraints of the AbTech ModelQuest
Prospector abductive network synthesizer of 75 features. In addition, they were
also used to rank these selected features.
3.4.1 Wrapper Method
Abductive Network
For the Wrapper method, we followed the procedure proposed by Abdel-Aal
et. al in [22]. Feature ranking using abductive networks does so based on the
predictive quality of the data, based on the following steps:
1. Change setting of model synthesis to select three inputs at a time. This
method is used to restrict number of selected features to three which will
help in ranking the features in groups of maximum size three.
2. Remove selected features to force the model to select from less predictive
remaining features.
3. Repeat the process until all features are selected or no further features can
be selected. Change model complexity in steps from small to large, if needed,
to force the modeler to select remaining features.
After feature ranking we do feature selection, by applying the top ranked
features one by one as long as the accuracy of selected model is non-decreasing.
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We stop when the accuracy drops, as an indication of model overfitting. We
follow this procedure at different levels of model complexity, numbers of layers,
and numbers of inputs.
3.4.2 Filter Method
The features are filtered to create the most prominent features subset before
the start of learning process. Filter methods use heuristics for feature ranking,
such as information gain heuristic.
Information Gain
Information gain is used to rank attribute individually on basis of separating
the classes of the training examples. Attribute rank can be calculated using
information gain with respect to class using the following formula:
Information gain = (Dx)− (D−x) (3.1)
where, Dx is the information which includes attribute x, and D−x is informa-
tion which excludes attribute x. The value of D−x is calculated as the average of
each value that this particular attribute can take.
The information itself is calculated using the entropy equation:
entropy =
n∑
k=1
pklogpk (3.2)
We used this method for ranking NSL-KDD-99 features to select the most
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prominent 75 features in order to overcome the restriction of the AbTech Mod-
elQuest Prospector abductive network synthesizer features. We have 70 services
and we want to reduce them into 22 services to get a total of 75 features.
Chi-square
Chi-square is a statistical method used to rank features individually on the
basis of separating the classes of the training examples. Attribute ranks can be
calculated in the following way:
1. Create a table that calculates frequencies of values of attributes under each
class.
2. Calculate the expected value (EV )for each attribute, as follows:
EV =
(class count for that value ∗ values count for that class)
total number of instances
(3.3)
3. Calculate:
ChiV al(attribute) =
v∑
k=1
c∑
l=1
ChiCell(expectedk,l) (3.4)
, where v is the values count for the attribute and, c is the class count.
24
4. ChiCell calculated as following:
diff ∗ diff/expected (3.5)
where
diff = expected− valuefrequency (3.6)
We used this method for ranking NSL-KDD-99 features based on ChiVal in
Equation 3.4 to select the most prominent 75 features in order to overcome the
restriction of the AbTech ModelQuest Prospector abductive network synthesizer
of 75 features. We have 70 services and we want to reduce them into 22 services
to obtain a total of 75 features. Table 3.4 shows the selected services.
Information gain ratio
Information gain ratio is a modification of information gain that solves the
problem of its bias toward features which have many values. For example, if a
dataset contains the serial numbers of customers, then the information gain of
the customer serial number will be high, and it will be used at the high level
in decision trees. This bias degrades the ability of learning algorithms, such as
decision trees, of generalization of new customers because the serial number will
be considered on the top of decision tree, which does not have any indicator to
generalize with.
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Table 3.2: Confusion Matrix
Information gain ratio corrects the information gain by taking the intrinsic
information of using that attribute as split into account.Intrinsic information is
the entropy of distribution of instances values.
Gain Ratio is large when the data is evenly spread and is small when the data
has one value.
Gain Ratio is calculated as following:
Gain Ratio(”Feature”) =
gain(”Atrribute”)
intrinsic info(”Atrribute”)
(3.7)
intrinsic info(”Atrribute”) = −
∑ | Si |
| S | ∗ log2
| Si |
| S | (3.8)
3.5 Performance Measures
Performance of classifiers in Artificial Intelligence is measured using several
metrics. The confusion matrix is a visualization tool for tabulating the overall
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performance of the classifier, as shown in Table 3.2. Each row of the matrix
represents the instances in a predicted class, while each column represents the
instances in an actual class. The following simple measures are derived from
confusion matrix from Table 3.2, and will be used in evaluating our classifiers:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FN + FP
(3.9)
Recall = truepositiverate =
TP
TP + FN
(3.10)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3.11)
Specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(3.12)
Detection rate =
total number of detected attacks
Total Number of attacks
∗ 100% (3.13)
where:
TP: true positive is the number of positives classified as positive.
FP: false negative is the number of negatives classified as positive.
TN: true negative is the number of negatives classified as negative.
FN: false negative is the number of positives classified as negative.
3.5.1 ROC graphs
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) graphs were developed during WWII
to statistically model false positive and false negative detections of radar operators.
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It is a standard graph for measurements used in medicine and biology. ROC
curves are generated by plotting outputs of classifiers over different threshold
values. Each threshold value will result in one point in the ROC curve. Each
point represents different trade off (cost values) between false positives and false
negatives. The ROC area represents performance averaged over all possible cost
ratios [23, 24].
The ROC area quantifies classifier performance as follows:
 1.0: perfect prediction
 0.9: excellent prediction
 0.8: good prediction
 0.7: mediocre prediction
 0.6: poor prediction
 0.5: random prediction
 less than 0.5: poor prediction.
3.5.2 Precision-Recall graphs
Precision-Recall (PR) curves, often used in Information Retrieval [25,26], have
been cited as an alternative to ROC curves for tasks with a large skew in the
class distribution [27, 28]. An important difference between ROC space and PR
space is the visual representation of the curves. Looking at PR curves can expose
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Figure 3.1: ROC and PR curves for performance measurements
[23]
differences between algorithms that are not apparent in ROC space. Sample ROC
curves and PR curves are shown in Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) respectively. These
curves, taken from the same learned models on a highly-skewed cancer detection
dataset, highlight the visual difference between these spaces. The goal in ROC
space is to be in the upper-left-hand corner, and when one looks at the ROC
curves in Figure 3.1(a) they appear to be fairly close to optimal. In the PR space,
algorithm 2 shows remarkable improvement over algorithm 1. In the PR space the
goal is to be in the upper-right-hand corner, and the PR curves in Figure 3.1(b)
show that there is still a vast room for improvement [23,24].
3.6 Simulation and Results
Simulation on the NSL-KDD dataset described in Section 3.1 was performed.
First, the 22 most prominent services using information gain, gain ratio and chi-
square feature ranking methods described in Section 3.4 was selected. The selected
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service features are shown in Table 3.4. The resulting dataset consists of 75
features that satisfy the constraint limit on the maximum number of input features
of the GMDH AIM tool.
By following the procedure for feature ranking explained in section 3.4.1, we
get an ordered list of features and the accuracy of the models as shown in Table 3.3.
The top ranked features are then used to build models by adding one feature at
a time. We developed 65 abductive network models with 4 layers and different
CPM. Figure 3.3 shows the accuracy of the synthesized models at different number
of input features with diffident CPM values. Figure 3.3 shows that no overfitting
occurs when the number of network layers is limited to 4 layers (the default setting
of AIM tool). However, this figure shows that the accuracy of the synthesized
models improves at certain points. The overfitting does not occur which shows
that the synthesized networks are not complex enough to fit the data and there
is room for improvement. So, we run the simulation again with the number of
network layers set to five and by using different CPM values. Figure 3.2 shows
that the model starts overfitting when the k = 14 and stabilizes when k = 20.
From previous simulations, we get the best selected features that will be used
in next two chapters. We select the features that selected at each model that
gives better performance than previous models and combine them with the se-
lected top $k$ features resulting using a five layers network. The top selected fea-
tures were found to be “protocol=icmp”,“Flag=SF”, “same srv rate”, “loged in”,
“dst host same srv rate”, “dst host same src port rate”. “protocol=icmp” helps
30
Table 3.3: Feature Selection Using GMDH.
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Figure 3.2: Feature selection detection rate vs. number of features used, to build
abductive network models with 5 layers
in discriminating between normal traffic and DoS ping flood attack traffic.
“Flag=SF” shows that the connection has been created and terminated nor-
mally, which helps in defining normal traffic profile and detecting the devia-
tion from normal profiles. “same srv rate” shows the percentage of connec-
tions that were made to the same service, among the connections aggregated
in count. “same srv rate” helps in predicting exhaustive attacks. “logged in” has
a great discrimination power in predicting R2L attacks.“dst host same srv rate”
gives percentage of connections from clients to the same service in the
same host. “dst host same srv rate” and “dst host same src port rate” give
the percentage of connections to the current host having the same src port.
“dst host same src port rate” helps in predicting if there is a possible DDoS at-
tack or not. “hot” indicators can be used to monitor if any hidden directories are
created during the FTP session, which belongs to remote-to-local (R2L) attacks.
All selected features are from the top 30 features agreed upon by the GMDH,Chi-
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Figure 3.3: Feature selection accuracy vs. number of features used, to build
abductive network models
square, information gain and gain ratio. Except for “hot” which is selected based
on the GMDH feature selection simulation.
Service Information Gain Gain Ratio Chi-Square
http 0.2658512 0.29388 39832.01107
private 0.1697134 0.25498 25477.78802
domain u 0.0675209 0.18124 8445.63123
smtp 0.0410314 0.12836 5678.2804
eco i 0.022086 0.09792 3474.78694
ecr i 0.0188803 0.114 2834.18276
ftp data 0.0064218 0.02105 1074.36367
Z39 50 0.0075894 0.12853 996.92344
uucp 0.006864 0.12635 901.49764
courier 0.0064574 0.12506 848.0208
bgp 0.0062454 0.12437 820.13544
whois 0.0060952 0.12387 800.38977
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 Feature ranking to select the most prominent services
Service Information Gain Gain Ratio Chi-Square
uucp path 0.0060599 0.12375 795.74451
iso tsap 0.0060423 0.12369 793.42199
imap4 0.005465 0.11765 734.08515
nnsp 0.005539 0.12194 727.26134
vmnet 0.0054243 0.12153 712.1805
ctf 0.004948 0.11975 649.57046
csnet ns 0.0047893 0.11913 628.71242
supdup 0.0047804 0.1191 627.55382
discard 0.0047275 0.11889 620.60258
http 443 0.004657 0.11861 611.3353
daytime 0.0045777 0.11829 600.91102
gopher 0.0045513 0.11818 597.4366
efs 0.0042605 0.11697 559.22886
systat 0.00419 0.11667 549.96941
link 0.0041724 0.11659 547.65473
exec 0.0041636 0.11655 546.49742
hostnames 0.0040403 0.11601 530.29699
name 0.003961 0.11566 519.88433
urp i 0.0041202 0.09424 515.41122
mtp 0.0038553 0.11518 506.00311
domain 0.0033385 0.08008 502.73541
echo 0.0038113 0.11498 500.22006
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 Feature ranking to select the most prominent services
Service Information Gain Gain Ratio Chi-Square
klogin 0.0038025 0.11494 499.0635
login 0.0037673 0.11478 494.43746
ldap 0.0036 0.11399 472.46779
netbios dgm 0.003556 0.11378 466.68741
time 0.0029305 0.06252 462.50033
sunrpc 0.0033448 0.11274 438.94796
netbios ssn 0.0031776 0.11188 416.99508
netstat 0.00316 0.11179 414.68464
netbios ns 0.0030457 0.11118 399.66855
finger 0.0021392 0.0201 368.3909
kshell 0.0026236 0.1088 344.25146
nntp 0.0025973 0.10864 340.78929
ssh 0.0024276 0.09733 336.88638
auth 0.0018888 0.02938 319.60455
sql net 0.0021491 0.10577 281.9578
telnet 0.0011589 0.00865 202.25324
IRC 0.0012728 0.07912 159.32225
ntp u 0.0012061 0.08227 146.45907
rje 0.0007537 0.09232 98.84794
pop 2 0.0006835 0.09124 89.64708
remote job 0.0006835 0.09124 89.64708
printer 0.0006046 0.08992 79.29752
Continued on next page
35
Table 3.5 Feature ranking to select the most prominent services
Service Information Gain Gain Ratio Chi-Square
other 0.0004133 0.0019 71.57628
shell 0.0003911 0.06131 58.49029
X11 0.0002957 0.04185 43.11474
pop 3 0.0001825 0.00842 30.716
urh i 0.0000717 0.05998 8.70687
red i 0.0000574 0.05873 6.96538
pm dump 0.0000438 0.06869 5.74328
aol 0 0 0
ftp 0 0 0
harvest 0 0 0
http 2784 0 0 0
http 8001 0 0 0
tftp u 0 0 0
tim i 0 0 0
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we elaborated upon the dataset used for the implementation
and testing of the GMDH-based and AODE-based intrusion detection systems.
We ranked and selected features based on four different feature selection algo-
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Selected Services Differentiation Ability
http sweep, neptune
private ipsweep, neptune, portsweep, satan, teardrop
domain u satan
Z39 50 neptune and portsweep.
smtp ipsweep, portsweep, neptune and satan
uucp portsweep and satan
courier portsweep and neptune
bgp neptune
whois ipsweep, neptune and portsweep
uucp path neptune and portsweep
iso tsap neptune.00
nnsp neptune
vmnet neptune, portsweep and satan
ctf neptune and nmap scan
csnet ns neptune and portsweep
supdup neptune and portsweep
discard neptune and satan
http 443 neptune and portsweep
daytime neptune and portsweep
gopher ipsweep and neptune
imap4 imap and neptune
efs neptune and portsweep
systat neptune and portsweep
link neptune, ipsweep and portsweep
exec neptune
Table 3.4: Selected services with differentiation ability between normal and
anomalous traffic.
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GMDH chi-sequare Information gain Information Gain Ratio
4 38 38 36
36 39 39 32
62 63 63 45
45 62 62 59
67 36 66 58
69 66 36 71
66 67 67 72
72 68 68 39
73 45 71 62
59 71 45 14
71 56 72 63
74 58 58 38
58 72 59 19
60 59 56 11
70 32 32 66
14 14 70 70
32 70 14 67
61 65 65 68
2 69 69 41
19 19 19 20
56 64 64 56
57 57 57 23
63 74 74 24
64 11 11 16
3 73 73 6
65 60 60 17
68 61 61 10
11 3 20 25
20 20 3 5
28 4 4 21
Table 3.6: Top ranked 30 features using diffrent ranking algorithms.
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rithms. The best selected features were subsequently tabulated, and their im-
portance to intrusion detection was explained. Different evaluation measures for
intrusion detection systems, such as ROC and PR curves, were also elaborated
upon.
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CHAPTER 4
GMDH-BASED INTRUSION
DETECTION
Abductory inductive mechanism (AIM) is a powerful supervised inductive
learning tool for automatically synthesizing neural network models from a
database of input and output values [23]. The model emerging from the AIM
synthesis process is a robust and compact transformation implemented as a lay-
ered abductive network of feed-forward functional elements as shown in Figure 4.1.
The potential for GMDH in anomalous traffic has not been previously explored
in the literature. However, compared to other neural networks and learning tools,
this method offers the advantages of faster model development requiring little user
intervention, faster convergence during model synthesis without the issue of get-
ting trapped in local minima, automatic selection of relevant input variables, and
automatic configuration of the generated model structure.
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Figure 4.1: Abductive network operating with three layers, and various functional
elements [29].
4.1 Abductive machine learning
The abductive machine learning approach is based on the self organizing group
method of data handling (GMDH) [30]. The GMDH approach is a proven concept
for iterated polynomial regression that can generate polynomial models in effective
predictors. The iterative process involves using initially defined simple regression
relationships, to derive more accurate representations in the next iteration in an
evolutionary manner.
The algorithm selects the polynomial relationships and the input combina-
tions that minimize the prediction error, during each iteration. This prevents
exponential growth in the number of polynomial models generated. Iterations are
stopped automatically at a point in time, when a balance between model com-
plexity for accurate fitting of the training data, and model simplicity that allows
it to generalize new data accurately, is achieved.
In the classical GMDH-based approach abductive network models are con-
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structed by the following 6 steps [30]:
1. Separating the original data into training data and testing data.
2. Generating the combinations of the input variables in each layer.
3. Calculating the partial descriptors
4. Selecting optimum descriptors
5. Iteration until stopping criteria is met
The algorithm has three main components: Representation, Selection and
Stopping. AIM uses PSE for selection and stopping, to avoid overfitting. Fig-
ure 4.2 shows the relationship that is represented through the following equations:
PSE = FSE + KP (4.1)
KP = CPM ∗ 2K
N
∗ S2p (4.2)
where:
PSE is the predicted squared error.
FSE is the fitting squared error on training data.
CPM is the complexity penalty multiplier.
N number of samples in training set.
Sp is the prior estimate for the variance of dependent variable.
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between FSE,PSE and KP [29].
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4.2 AIM Functional Element
AIM supports the following functional elements:
 Normaliser: Transforms the original input into a normalized variable hav-
ing a mean of zero and a variance of unity. The normaliser is represented as
follows:
y = z0 + z1x (4.3)
where x is the input variable and y is the normalized input, while z0 and z1
are the coefficients.
 Unitizer: Converts the range of the network outputs to a range with the
mean and variance of the output values used to train the network, which in
other words maps the output of GMDH to the input problem space.
 Single Node: The single node has only one input and the polynomial
equation is limited to the third degree, i.e.
y = z0 + z1x + z2x
2 + z3x
3 (4.4)
where x is the input to the node, y is the output of the node and z0, z1, z2
and z3 are the node coefficients.
 Double Node: The double node takes two inputs and the third-degree
polynomial equation includes cross term so as to consider the interaction
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between the two inputs, i.e.
y = z0 + z1xi + z2xj + z3x
2
i + z4x
2
j + z5xixj + z6x
3
i + z7x
3
j (4.5)
where xi, xj are the inputs to the node, y is the output of the node and z0,
z1, z2 and z7 are the node coefficients.
 Triple Node: Similar to the single and double nodes, the triple node with
three inputs has a more complicated polynomial equation allowing the in-
teraction among these inputs.
4.3 Abductive Network Ensemble
Network ensemble is a learning approach where different networks cooperate
to provide a solution to the same problem. These networks are trained on
different portions of the training data set, with different input features, or
different architectures. As a result, higher recognition rates are achievable
because with diversity in decision making the error may cancel out. The
final output may be based on one of two criteria:
1. Simple majority vote:
The final output is simply the majority vote of ensemble network mem-
bers.
2. Simple averaging of ensemble network members:
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The final output is the average of all network ensemble member out-
puts, as follows:
zi =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (4.6)
4.4 Simulation and Results
In this section we simulate our proposed GMDH-based intrusion detection
system. From the resulting ROC curves, the best threshold/cut off value was
found to be 0.422. At this point on the curve, a higher true positive rate (TPR)
is achieved, versus the lowest possible false positive rate (FPR).
4.4.1 Monolithic abductive models
For monolithic abductive models, the simulation was performed using all
features from the training set, and different CPM values, i.e. , CPM =
0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 5. The results for this simulation are shown in Table 4.1. In Fig-
ure 4.3, the ROC curve for all models using different CPM values are shown.
From the ROC curves, it is evident that they all yield similar detection rates.
The areas under the curve are almost equal to 99% for all cases. Figure 4.4 shows
the Precision-Recall curves for different abductive networks synthesized using dif-
ferent model complexity values. These curves are almost the same for models with
CPM = 0.1 and 5. The other models with CPM = 0.5, 1 and 2 are the same.
They slightly outperform previous models in terms of recall.
We also ran the simulation with the first 14 and 20 GMDH top ranked features,
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the ROC curve for five abductive network classifiers:
when CPM = 0.1, CPM = 0.5, CPM = 1,CPM = 2 and CPM = 5.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for five abductive network
classifiers: the optimum monolithic model when CPM = 0.1, CPM = 0.5,
CPM = 1,CPM = 2 and CPM = 5.
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FN TN FP TP TP FAR DR CPM
57 2769 65 2358 0.022 0.976 0.1
57 2769 65 2358 0.022 0.976 0.5
60 2777 57 2355 0.020 0.975 1
56 2773 61 2359 0.021 0.976 2
57 2769 65 2358 0.022 0.976 5
Table 4.1: Performance results of different abductive network models synthesized
using different CPM values.
FN TN FP TP FAR DR No. Of Features
112 2753 81 2303 0.028 0.953 14
74 2775 59 2341 0.020 0.969 20
Table 4.2: Performance results of two abductive network models synthesized using
14 and 20 top ranked GMDH features.
CPM = 1, and the number of layers as 4. The results were not as good as using
the full feature set, but were comparable to an extent. However, it was noticed
that the training time for this case was much less than when using the full feature
set. Table 4.2 shows the results of using the top 14 and 20 features, respectively.
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we show ROC and PR curves for abductive network
models synthesized using first 14 and 20 features respectively.
Subsequently, we ran the simulation using the best feature set, i.e. features
4, 19, 36, 62, 67, 69, 70, 72, 55. The results were better than running the training
over the entire dataset in terms of both the training time and the accuracy. Ta-
ble 4.3 shows the results of monolithic abductive network models synthesized using
the full training set and 38% randomly selected instances from the training set.
CPM Accuracy Specificity Sensitivity TP FP TN FN
1 0.9779 0.9785 0.9772 2360 61 2773 55
1 0.9783 0.9774 0.9793 2365 64 2770 50
Table 4.3: Performance results of different abductive network models synthesized
using the best features and CPM = 1, trained on a) full training set, and b) 38%
random portion of the data.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the ROC curve for two abductive network classifiers
synthesized using 14 and 20 top ranked GMDH features.
Figure 4.6: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for two abductive network
classifiers synthesized using 14 and 20 top ranked GMDH features.
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FN TN FP TP FAR DR Model
60 2777 57 2355 0.020 0.975 Monolithic
73 2786 48 2342 0.016 0.970 Averaged ensemble
63 2773 61 2352 0.021 0.973 Vote Ensemble
Table 4.4: Performance results of ensemble network individual models synthesized
using model complexity of 1.
4.4.2 Ensemble abductive models
From the above simulation, we observed that the best model was synthesized
for CPM = 1. So, we choose this value, and built an ensemble network of
three different abductive network models, using CPM = 1, and all features. The
results of the ensemble network were compared both in terms of ROC as well
as Precision-Recall curves. The comparison ROC curve is shown in Figure 4.7.
The curve indicates a slightly improved result when the ensemble network is used.
The area under the curve for ensemble is 0.9963, whereas for the monolithic, it
is 0.993. Table 4.4 shows the performance measures of each committee member
network. Precision-Recall curves in Figure 4.8 shows that ensemble networks are
always better than monolithic models, except for certain threshold values, when
the precision of monolithic is higher than ensemble networks, albeit with the same
recall values.
4.4.3 Abductive networks using Feature Selection
After performing simulation runs with all features selected, we synthesized
abductive networks using the top 14 selected features, from the different feature
selection algorithms studied in Chapter 3. The resulting networks are compared
using ROC and Precision-Recall curves, as shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. It
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the ROC curve for two abductive network classifiers:
the optimum monolithic model when CPM = 1 and 3 member network ensemble
using simple averaging.
Figure 4.8: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for two abductive network
classifiers: the optimum monolithic model when CPM = 1 and 3 member network
ensemble using simple averaging.
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FN TN FP TP FAR DR Model
112 2753 81 2303 0.028 0.953 GMDH-GMDH
152 2712 122 2263 0.043 0.937 GMDH-IG
59 2602 232 2356 0.082 0.975 GMDH-GR
Table 4.5: Performance results of different network models synthesized using top
14 features selected using different feature selection algorithms
can be observed here that abductive networks synthesized using the GMDH top-
ranked features outperform abductive networks synthesized using the entire fea-
ture set, and different ranking methods. The abductive networks synthesized
using gain ratio top-ranked features outperform abductive networks synthesized
using top features of information gain feature ranking method. The PR curve
shows that networks synthesized using information gain have better recall values
vs. the some precision values. However, this is not important because it does not
occur in the best area of PR graph.
The area under the curve for the abductive network model synthesized using
the top 14 GMDH features is 0.993, whereas the area under the curve for the
abductive network model synthesized using the top 14 Gain Ratio features is
0.990, and the area under the curve using the top 14 Information Gain features
is 0.983. Table 4.5 shows the performance measures of each committee member
network.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a detailed description of the GMDH implemen-
tation of the intrusion detection system. Results of simulation of the monolithic
52
Figure 4.9: Comparison of the ROC curve for three abductive network classifiers:
network model synthesized using top 14 GMDH ranked features, top 14 GR ranked
features and top 14 IG ranked features.
Figure 4.10: Comparison of the PR curve for three abductive network classifiers:
network model synthesized using top 14 GMDH ranked features, top 14 GR ranked
features and top 14 IG ranked features.
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abductive network models were discussed. Subsequently, the results of simula-
tion of ensemble abductive network models were discussed. Thirdly, the results
of simulation of abductive network models synthesized using top selected fea-
tures, were elaborated upon. Ensemble networks using simple averaging combiner
shows slight improvement over monolithic networks. The feature selection proved
to yield higher detection rates, and quicker training times.
54
CHAPTER 5
AVERAGED
ONE-DEPENDENCE
ESTIMATOR-BASED
INTRUSION DETECTION
Na¨ıve Bayesian has been applied successfully in many fields of machine learn-
ing. Its simplicity and high classification accuracy has attracted many researchers
in diverse fields to use it for their classification applications. With its success, it
still suffers from the attribute independence problem. Many proposals to alleviate
this issue, while retaining the simplicity of Na¨ıve bayesian classification have been
proposed in the literature. Zheng et. al. proposed lazy Bayesian rules to alle-
viate the attribute independence problem of Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier [31]. Lazy
Bayesian Rules create a conjunctive rule to select the most significant subset of
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training examples and then induce the Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier using this subset.
This method outperforms Na¨ıve Bayesian in terms of minimizing bias, at the cost
of increasing the variance and classification time. Figure 5.1 [32, 33] shows a vi-
sual example of trade-offs between bias and variance. Keogh et. al. proposed a
method to alleviate the attribute independence problem of Na¨ıve Bayesian by al-
lowing each attribute to depend on a maximum of one other attribute besides the
class attribute [34]. Their initial proposal was called One Dependence Estimator
(ODE). However, their approach suffered from high delays for model selection be-
cause of the need to check all m∗(m−1) alternatives of m attribute dependencies,
while building the model (during the training phase). Each model is evaluated
using leave one out validation method, which is time consuming as well. It is an
evaluation method that runs n times on a data set of n instances by using n-1
training instances and 1 test instance. Keogh et al. proposed another method that
overcomes the delay associated with ODE [34]. Their method is called the Super
Parent One Dependence Estimator (SPODE). SPODE solves some of the prob-
lems of ODE, by allowing all attributes to depend only on one other attribute
called the super parent. There are two configurations of SPODE, namely, Full
SPODE and Partial SPODE. Partial SPODE outperforms full SPODE because
in reality not all attributes depend on the same attribute. However, recognizing
some dependencies makes it outperform Na¨ıve Bayes.
AODE eliminates model selection problem in ODE and SPODE by averaging
all full SPODEs.
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Figure 5.1: Bias and Variance [33].
Figure 5.2: Na¨ıve Bayesian [35].
Figure 5.3: One Dependence Estimator [35].
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Figure 5.4: Super Parent One Dependence Estimator [35].
5.1 Na¨ıve Bayes
In the Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm, each attribute has only one parent, which is
the class attribute, as shown in Figure 5.2. Na¨ıve bayes predicts from a training
sample of classified objects, the class of a sample x = x1,x2...,xn,where xi is the
value of the ith attribute. We can minimize error by selecting argmaxy P (y | x) ,
where y ∈ {c1, ...ck} are the k classes. It is intended to seek an estimate Pˆ (y | x)
of P (y | x) and perform classification by selecting argmaxy Pˆ (y | x).
Nave Bayesian prediction requires each conditional probability to be non zero.
Otherwise, the predicted probability will result in a zero.
Pˆ (X | y) =∏nk=1 P (xk | y)
In order to overcome this, the probability estimation is done by one of the following
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three methods:
Original : P (xi | C) = Nic
Nc
(5.1)
Laplace : P (xi | C) = Nic + 1
Nc + c
(5.2)
m− estimate : P (xi | C) = Nic + m ∗ p
Nc + m
(5.3)
where
c: number of classes
p: prior probability, and
m: parameter
Na¨ıve Bayes classifies by selecting argmaxy(Pˆ (y)
∏n
i=1 Pˆ (xi | y))
where:
Pˆ (y) and Pˆ (xi | y) are estimates of respective probabilities derived from the
sample training set, with possible corrections such as laplace, as mentioned earlier.
5.2 AODE
AODE (averaged,one-dependence estimators) is a Bayesian method that
solves the problem of attribute-independence assumption in Na¨ıve Bayes. The
algorithm outperforms ODE and SPODE in terms of accuracy with less com-
putation time [36]. AODE achieve this by eliminating model selection. The
algorithm solves the independence assumption of Na¨ıve Bayes by averaging all
models that have a single attribute as a parent to all others. For quality, the
algorithm will restrict parents to attributes having more than thirty values.
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Moreover, the algorithm gives more accurate classification than Na¨ıve Bayes on
datasets with non-independent attributes. At training time, as illustrated by the
algorithm in Table 5.1, a three dimensional frequency joint table, indexed by class
values for one dimension and attribute values for the other two dimensions, is
generated. Subsequently, at classification time an m-estimate is used to produce
conservative estimates of conditional probabilities from joint frequencies, using
the table generated during training.
The probability for a given data row of a dataset to belong to a given class y
using AODE is given by:
Pˆ (y, x) =
(
∑
i:1≤ı≤norF (xi)≥m Pˆ (y, xi)
∏n
j=1 Pˆ (xj | y, xi))
i : 1 ≤ ı ≤ norF (xi) ≥ m (5.4)
AODE classifies by selecting argmaxy(
∑
i:1≤i≤norF (xi)≥m Pˆ (y, xi)
∏n
j=1 Pˆ (xj |
y, xi)), and can be extended to provide direct class probability estimates by
normalizing the numerators of previously obtained probabilities, across all classes.
The time complexity of training is given by O(n2i), where i is the number of
training instances and n is the number of attributes. Training time complexity is
linear with respect to the training set size. Thus, AODE is an efficient algorithm
for classification from large datasets.
The time complexity of classifying an object is O(n2c), where n is number of
attributes and c is the number of classes. The space requirement for the algorithm
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Table 5.1: Training time algorithm [36].
is the space needed to store the joint frequency table, given by O((nv)2c) where
v is the average number of attribute values.
5.3 Simulation Analysis
The first Na¨ıve Bayes simulation using a training set of 15747 instances and
a test set of 5249 was performed, to observe an accuracy of 94.19%, as can be
seen from Figure 5.5. Then, the simulation with the top most prominent features
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obtained using the GMDH algorithm was carried out, and an accuracy of 99.30%
was noticed. Our third simulation run was with the top 16 ranked features, as
acquired from information gain and chi-square, to obtain an accuracy of 92.11%.
Using information gain ratio, an accuracy of 94.01% was observed. We provide a
detailed performance comparison in Table 5.2, for the Naiive Bayes simulation on
the dataset.
From Figure 5.5, we see that using the top ranked gain ratio features to build
the Na¨ıve Bayes model helps achieve the highest detection rate of all feature
selection algorithms. AUC using top ranked gain ratio features is 98.73%, followed
by GMDH best feature set, which yields an area of 97.95%. Using all features, an
accuracy of 97.78% is observable, and information gain yields an area of 96.03%.
Figure 5.5 shows that the precision-recall graph for some threshold values using
information gain for feature ranking, always outperform all other models built
using the other feature ranking methods/approaches, in terms of precision and
recall. NB models build using all features gives second best results, but, for some
thresholds NB models built using GMDH feature selection outperform others in
terms of recall. Na¨ıve Bayes models built using GMDH outperform NB models
built using top ranked gain ratio features, in term of recall. On the other hand,
NB models built using top ranked gain ratio features outperform NB models built
using GMDH best features in terms of precision.
The ROC and Precision-Recall graphs in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show that the
best AODE models outperform Na¨ıve Bayes. Moreover, the curve shows that the
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of the ROC curve for different feature sets used in building
the NB model.
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for different AODE models
built using different feature sets.
FN TN FP TP FAR DR model
377 2830 25 2017 0.008 0.843 NB-GR
392 2833 22 2002 0.007 0.836 NB-IG
433 2781 74 1961 0.025 0.819 NB-GMDH
274 2824 31 2120 0.010 0.885 NB-Full
Table 5.2: Performance results for the NB implementation for intrusion detection.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of the ROC curve for different AODE models built using
different feature sets.
Figure 5.8: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for different AODE models
built using different feature sets.
FN TN FP TP FAR DR model
13 2841 14 2381 0.005 0.994 AODE-GR
14 2838 17 2380 0.006 0.994 AODE-IG
138 2818 37 2256 0.012 0.942 AODE-GMDH
11 2852 3 2383 0.001 0.995 AODE-Full
Table 5.3: Performance results for the AODE implementation for intrusion detec-
tion.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the ROC curve for the best AODE model and best NB
model.
whole AODE curve is always close to a 100% true positive rate and close to a zero
false positive rate. This indicates how accurate the AODE model has proven to
be, for intrusion detection.
5.4 Result Comparison
In Figures 5.11 and 5.12, a comparison of the AODE detector and the Na¨ıve
Bayes detector is shown. The AODE model outperforms NB and GMDH abduc-
tive network models, with the curve being close to unity for the True Positive
Rate, and zero for the False Positive Rate. This is followed by GMDH abduc-
tive networks, and Na¨ıve Bayes, giving an area of 99.93%, 99.66% and 98.73%
respectively with standard errors of 0.0, 0.001 and 0.002.
While comparing results from the previous chapter, with those given in this
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve for the best AODE model
and best NB model.
Figure 5.11: Comparison of the ROC curve between the best AODE model, best
NB model and best GMDH model.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of the Precision-Recall curve between the best AODE
model, best NB model and best GMDH model.
chapter, it can be seen that AODE outperforms GMDH and NB in terms of
detection rate and false alarm rate, with the highest observed Detection Rate
of 99.54% and False Alarn Rate of 00.1%. The GMDH detector yields a DR of
97.72% which comes second after AODE. However, it gives the worst FAR of
2.25%. NB detector gives a DR of 88.55% and FAR of 1.08%. This shows that
statistical inference detectors perform better than GMDH, in terms of minimizing
the false alarms.
As expected, results shows that filter feature selection methods produce better
results than the GMDH-based wrapper method when used with Na¨ıve Bayes and
AODE. This is because filter methods are more generic and are based on statistical
inference. On the other hand, from the results we can also see that the GMDH
based wrapper methods yield better results when used with GMDH abductive
networks. This is because GMDH-based wrapper methods incorporate the GMDH
67
algorithm in its process of feature selection.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed an AODE implementation for intrusion detection.
We performed simulations using various feature selection techniques, and both
Na¨ıve Bayes and AODE for classification. The results were compared with those
obtained previously from the GMDH intrusion detection system. It was noticed
that AODE outperforms GMDH and Na¨ıve Bayes in terms of detection rates,
false alarm rates, as well as training time. It was also observed that GMDH
outperforms Na¨ıve Bayes in terms of detection and false alarm rates.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the contributions achieved.
Moreover, it discusses some of the open problems for future work.
6.1 Results Comparison
Table 6.1 shows that our AODE approach outperforms all other methods in
terms of false alarms rate and comes second only to ESOM, in terms of detec-
tion rates. However, the difference is negligible. GMDH comes second after
AODE/ESOM in terms of detection rate, and fourth in terms of false alarms.
FAR DR Method
2% 96.07% PCC [37]
2.25% 97.72% GMDH**
00.1% 99.54% AODE**
1.08% 88.55% NB**
3.4% 99.56% ESOM [38]
3.5% 93% MLP [39]
Table 6.1: Performance Comparison between various intelligent techniques for
intrusion detection.
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As part of this thesis, the following contributions were made:
1. Different anomaly-based intrusion detection systems were studied.
2. Data reduction techniques were used to reduce the input feature set to the
intrusion detection system.
3. Two techniques, namely GMDH-based and AODE-based, were proposed for
intelligent classification of network traffic.
4. Simulations were performed, and the results were compared using evaluation
measures explained in Section 3.5, to test the effectiveness of the proposed
approaches for intrusion detection.
6.2 Future Work
Many issues in the Intrusion Detection problem are open for further research.
Some of them are:
 Alternative detection techniques: Multi agent detection systems that
can detect DDoS attacks efficiently.
 Dataset problems: The dataset still old and intrusions are emerging day
by day. So, there should be a way to create recent new specialized datasets
for attack types.
 Information visualization techniques: Information visualization is hot
emerging science that can be utilized for intrusion detection. ArchSight
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event correlation is an example of using information visualization for intru-
sion detection.
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APPENDIX A
C# CODE FOR DATA
HANDLING
A.1 Code for calculating accuracy for gmdh re-
sult files
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